Abstract. Random diffusion is shown to be an important mechanism on fostering cooperative behavior among simple agents (memoryless, unconditional cooperators or defectors) living on a spatially structured environment. In particular, under the Prisoner's Dilemma framework, when allowing the agents to move with the simple "always-move" rule, we find that cooperative behavior is not only possible but may even be enhanced. In addition, for a broad range of densities, mobile cooperators can more easily invade a population of mobile defectors, when compared with the fully viscous, immobile case. Thus, such simple mobility pattern may have played a fundamental role both in the onset and development of cooperative behavior, paving the way to more complex, individual and group, motility rules.
.962 (this corresponds to the optimal density for cooperation) and 1. All simulations are performed on a square lattice of side length L=\ 00, 0=1.4, and cooperators (defectors) are represented by squares (crosses). Vacant sites are painted white. In the top left panel, cooperators may survive either because they are isolated or belong to a weakly predated cluster. The remaining panels present high density situations, well above the percolation threshold (a spanning cluster is present), with quite different cluster structures in each case. Notice that once the system percolates, the spanning cluster is formed by defectors, even when they are a minority (like in the bottom left panel).
considered are simple, unconditional and non retaliating, with no memory of previous steps. In other words, we are considering a basic scenario, whose importance is to settle the minimal conditions under which cooperative behavior might be sustained once the requirement of strong viscosity for spatial reciprocity is relaxed. In particular, we show that in the framework of the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game under the above conditions, cooperative behavior, besides being robust, can even be diffusion-enhanced. In any round of the PD game, each of two players either cooperates (C) or defects (D). Here we only consider pure strategies, although more complex rules, with memory of previous encounters, have been devised [2] . The payoff depends on the mutual choice and is given by the matrix whose elements are: a reward R (punishment P) if both cooperate (defect), S (sucker's payoff) and T (temptation) if one cooperates and the other defects, respectively. Moreover, these quantities should satisfy the inequalities T >R>P> S and 2R> T + S. Here we will take a simplified, one parameter version [19] : R= I, P = S=0 and T = b > 1. In a random mating, infinite population defecting will be the most rewarding strategy, independently of the opponent's choice. combats with its closest neighbors (if any) and accumulates the corresponding payoff, that will be compared, during the offspring step, with the payoff accumulated by the neighbors. We addressed in an earlier work [31] the question of the robustness of cooperation in spatial games in the presence of heterogeneous environments. By introducing quenched disorder in the lattice (random dilution) each individual would sense a locally varying social environment as the number of neighbors becomes site dependent, and optimal cooperation is achieved for weak disorder as the defects (or inaccessible regions) act as pinning fields, keeping the clusters of cooperators more protected from invasions. In this sense, an irregular landscape may enhance cooperation by introducing natural defenses against invasions of defectors. In fig. 1 we present several snapshots for the case where there are no mobile agents and different lattice occupations. When the density is low, the clusters are disconnected and the fate of each isolated cluster depends on the initial distribution of cooperators and defectors: cooperation is guaranteed by geographical isolation. As density increases, the system percolates. Interestingly, the spanning cluster is always built by defectors, while cooperators tend to organize in more compact groups, what is essential for their stability. Cooperation is maximized for weak disorder (p ~ 0.962) and it is the pinning effect of the empty sites that drives the enhancement in the amount of cooperators. Close to this value, the cluster geometry is also dramatically changed as can be observed in the figure. Moreover, the presence of disorder also has a remarkable effect in the way the system evolves, as can be seen in figure 2 , where the time evolution of five samples whose density is very close to the critical occupation is shown. After a fast transient there is a very slow increase of the number of cooperators that lasts several decades, followed by an abrupt, avalanche-like jump to the stationary state value. Such slow dynamics is a general feature of systems with quenched disorder and the average jumping time has a very fast increase as the lattice occupation approaches p ~ 0.962.
When the vacant sites are no longer held fixed, they may become occupied by a neighbor agent with a probability m that measures the populational viscosity. Only random, unbiased diffusion has been considered in Ref. [46] , although extensions to contingent rules are also being studied. As before, individuals combat with their closest neighbors and accumulate a given payoff. Then, they may either move or try to generate their offspring, following the player with the greatest payoff in the neighborhood. The detailed outcome of the game will depend on the precise implementation of the dynamics, in particular, the order in which combats, offspring generation and diffusion occur leads to qualitative and quantitative differences in the population. As an example, in fig. 3 the asymptotic state for a density far above the percolation threshold is shown for two dynamics where the order of the diffusive and offspring steps are reversed (Combat-Offspring-Diffusion, COD, and Combat-Diffusion-Offspring, CDO, dynamics). In the former, as the name says, each step consists of combats followed by the generation of offspring done in parallel, and then diffusion, while in the later, the diffusion and offspring steps are reversed. During the diffusive step, each agent makes an attempt to jump to an empty neighboring site, what is accepted with a probability m. Fig. 4 , with the temporal evolution of the average cooperator density p c , exemplifies the rich behavior presented by the model once mobility is introduced. The ultimate fate of cooperation depends on the population viscosity m, its total density and probably on the initial state: while in the COD dynamics (Fig. 4, left) the asymptotic density of cooperators decreases as m increases, in the CDO case (Fig. 4, right) , on the contrary, p c may increase with m for some values of p. The detailed dependence on the mobility and density of the asymptotic number of cooperators was studied in Ref. [46] , and it was shown that for broad conditions, cooperation is enhanced when compared with the viscous case of m = 0. This effect is even stronger in the CDO case: whenever m ^ 0, it is good for the cooperators to move away from their partner, whatever its strategy, after the combats and before the payoff comparison of the offspring step, what favors the CDO dynamics. In this way, an exploited cooperator can still leave descendants if, after diffusing, it is not neighbored by a high payoff defector. Another important effect is that mobility facilitates the onset of cooperation: as shown in Ref. [46] , starting with an initial patch with only two cooperators in a sea of defectors, the probability that cooperation overtakes the whole population is an increasing function of the mobility for a wide range of densities. In comparison, this has a very small probability of happening when mc^O.
A possible realization of such diffusion scenario may occur in organisms with extracellular metabolism, as is the case of some yeast cells [15] . Sugar is processed outside the cell by a secreted enzyme called invertase, creating a common resource for all surrounding cells. This offers the opportunity for defection as some cells may not have the cost of producing the enzyme but yet benefit from that produced by others. To what extent the cooperative behavior observed in such simple organisms is a sole effect of the underlying spatial structure or whether there is an enhancement factor due to diffusion is an open and interesting question. Moreover, in systems that present polarized motion (chemotaxis), depending on the concentration of cooperators, a gradient of nutrients may be present and both cooperators and defectors can migrate towards (away) high cooperator (defector) density regions. Thus, a possible rule in this case can be: "cooperators attract-defectors repel", but many others can be devised. Such non random rules may also develop cooperative swarming or foraging, relevant for evolving higher levels of biological organization, and is already found to occur in bacteria [13] .
Here we presented results for a simple spatial game where the patched environment allows explicit, although random, movement of agents whose strategies are pure, non retaliating (unconditional). The diffusion is Brownian, not relying on any type of explicit, genotypic or phenotypic assortment. Whether a given strategy is able or not to invade another population would strongly depend on how viscous a population is, the global density and the chosen dynamics. However, some universal conclusions can be stated. First of all, cooperation is possible under the above conditions, thus enlarging the limits for cooperative behavior. Second, for a broad range of the parameters (density, viscosity, etc), cooperation is enhanced in respect to the viscous case. Third, a rule like always-move, regardless of the opponent strategy, may increase the capability of cooperators to invade and overtake a population of defectors. In this sense, mobility may have a fundamental role in the problem of the onset of cooperation, and the evolution of a simple mobility as the one studied here, is a first step towards the emergence of more complex foraging behavior or even coherent, cooperative herding behavior.
